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TRANSFER PRICING: DATA DUMPS AND COMPARABILITY –
US, UK, Canadian, and Australian case studies
Richard T. Ainsworth & Andrew B. Shact1
Comparability is the heart of transfer pricing. The OECD,2 U.K.,3 Canadian,4
Australian5 and U.S.6 transfer pricing rules all echo one another on how critically
1

Biographical info.
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and Tax Administrations (Review of Comparability and of Profit Methods: Revision of
Chapters I-III of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines) ¶1.33 (July 22, 2010)
To be comparable means that none of the differences (if any) between the situations
being compared could materially affect the condition being examined in the methodology
(e.g. price or margin), or that reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate
the effect of any such differences.
available at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/23/12/45763692.pdf
3
The United Kingdom closely follows the OECD. The U.K.’s transfer pricing rules are found in Schedule
28AA of the Income and Corporate Tax Act, 1988. Paragraph 2 indicates that Sch. 28AA is to be
construed in a manner consistent with:
the expression of the arm's length principle in Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Convention on
Income and on Capital and the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and
Tax Administrations.
As a result, where transfer pricing rule interpretations conflict or appear ambiguous, the statute itself states
that the OECD materials take precedence to resolve them.
4
Canadian transfer pricing rules are found in the INCOME TAX ACT, R.S.C. 1985, §247 (Can.), with
interpretive guidance in Information Circular 87-2R (September 27, 1999). The Information Circular
expressly follows the 1995 OECD Guidelines. The Tax Court of Canada adopted the 1995 OECD
Guidelines in GlaxoSmithKline Inc., v. The Queen, 2008 TCC 324, ¶¶59-65 (May 30, 2008). It is not clear
if Canada will follow the 2010 revisions to the OECD Guidelines, even though that is the assumption of tax
advisors based in part on Canada’s past practices and the placement of a CRA official as the chair of the
OECD Working Party 9. [Ernst & Young, Tax Alert, 2010 Issue No. 28 (August 23, 2010) at 3.]
5
INCOME TAX ASSESSMENT ACT 1936, §136AD (Aust.); TR 97/20 ¶¶ 2.1 & 2.2 (emphasis added):
Conceptually, the arm's length principle requires a calculation of the taxable income that
might reasonably be expected if the parties were dealing at arm's length with one another.
It does this by contrasting the choices made and the outcomes achieved by the taxpayer
with those that would have resulted from the interaction of the forces of supply and
demand in a comparable open market, or from negotiating among comparable
independent parties in more complex settings. In effect, this uses the open market results
or the behavior of the independent parties dealing at arm's length with each other as a
benchmark.
The concept of comparability is therefore central to the application of the arm's length
principle.
6
United States, Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(b)(1) (emphasis added)
In determining the true taxable income of a controlled taxpayer, the standard to be
applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing at arm's length with an uncontrolled
taxpayer. A controlled transaction meets the arm's length standard if the results of the
transaction are consistent with the results that would have been realized if uncontrolled
taxpayers had engaged in the same transaction under the same circumstances (arm's
length result). However, because identical transactions can rarely be located, whether a
transaction produces an arm's length result generally will be determined by reference to
the results of comparable transactions under comparable circumstances.
2
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important the comparability analysis is. Performing this analysis and proving
comparability, however, is a demanding exercise.
What makes the proving comparability so difficult is that the analysis is two
sided. Both controlled and uncontrolled transactions must be thoroughly analyzed. Just
as much effort needs to be applied to determine the functions, contract terms, risks and
the economic conditions for the unrelated party comparables as is spent on analyzing the
related parties (taxpayers).
But there is more to this equation. On the “comparables side”, there are not one
but two steps. First a comparables search is needed. Then the search result differences
must be carefully scrutinized and adjust for differences if they are material.7 As the
OECD’s Guidelines (2010) indicate:
By definition, a comparison implies examining two terms: the controlled
transaction under review and the uncontrolled transactions that are
regarded as potentially comparable. The search for comparables is only
part of the comparability analysis. It should be neither confused with nor
separated from the comparability analysis. The search for information on
potentially comparable uncontrolled transactions and the process of
identifying comparables is dependent upon prior analysis of the taxpayer’s
controlled transaction and of the relevant comparability factors (see
paragraphs 1.38-1.63).8
Case law has always demanded this balanced or dual comparability analysis.
While this requirement has been implicit in the Internal Revenue Service regulations, it
recently it has become more explicit. The 2010 revisions to the OECD Guidelines
contain similar language reflecting this change.
The OECD has become critical of database dumps, extensive automated financial
database searches for potential comparables that are then dumped on (or presented to) tax
authorities as-they-are. This is problematic because the search is being offered as a
substitute for meaningful analysis. There is also anecdotal evidence that this data
dumping has become a common practice.9
7

Adjustments are normally made to the unrelated (independent or referent) parties rather than related
parties. Under OECD rules making related party adjustments implicates OECD Model Treaty Article 9(1).
Doing so means the transfer pricing analysis is not performed on the real transactions but rather on
hypothetical ones. See also: Treas. Reg. §1.482-1(d)(2) which states the same general rule. This is
different from isolating (separating) a transaction from a related parties’ other transactions. Separation is
appropriate, provided this process does not remove from consideration elements that have a material effect
on prices. In such case, aggregating transactions is required. See: infra note 112 and related text. This was
a problem in the Roche Products Pty. Ltd v. Commissioner (Australia) and the GlaxoSmithKline v. The
Queen cases considered herein.
8
OECD Guidelines (2010) supra note 2, at ¶3.1 (emphasis added).
9
For example, Dr. Deloris Wright, an economist and frequent expert witness in transfer pricing cases
observes:
Many of the [CPM] studies that cross the author's desk take a “database dump” approach
to the selection of comparables. In these cases, no reasonable person could argue that the
companies selected are comparable to the tested party, unless the sole search criterion is
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Some jurisdictions, like New Zealand, have challenged this practice10 while other
jurisdictions, like the US, appear more accepting. Thus, what may pass for comparability
in the US may not be acceptable in N.Z. or other jurisdictions. This creates difficulties
for firms relying on the same transfer pricing study for both US and foreign filings.
The database dump itself, no matter how well the screens or how carefully crafted
the filters, never provides solid proof that comparables have been found. At best, the
screens and filters provide rough-hewn results. Solid proof requires an entity level
analysis that:
(a) Identifies differences between the controlled and uncontrolled parties
(b) Assesses the materiality for each difference and if the differences are material,
then
(c) Specifies the adjustments needed to bring the uncontrolled parties into
alignment with the controlled parties
Case law requires this process because Judges demand proof as to comparability.
The place where jurisdictions differ is in how they answer the next question: What
happens when adjustment are not or cannot be made after material differences have been
identified? If one jurisdiction accepts search results as comparable (albeit with reduced
reliability)11 while another rejects them as incomparable12, then it becomes important for
an enterprise to further support its pricing study with a profit split. The only workable
method that does not require comparables is a profit split and this is where an audit will
likely go if all proposed comparables are rejected.

that the comparable companies operate a business. Proper selection of comparables is a
time-consuming, difficult challenge, but a necessary one, if the results are to be useful in
planning, audit defense, or/and APA negotiation.
Often, the database dump approach also results in a transfer pricing range from negative
infinity to positive infinity. Even when this is narrowed to the inter-quartile range, it is
virtually meaningless and does not assist the lawyers and accountants who must use the
information.
Deloris R. Wright, Certain Issues in the Use of Profit-based Methods, 10 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 895,
905 (2002).
10
New Zealand Inland Revenue, TRANSFER PRICING PRACTICE ISSUES, Comparables (December 1, 2010)
available at: http://www.ird.govt.nz/transfer-pricing/practice/transfer-pricing-practice-comparables.html
Industry data dumps don't work
The best comparables are those that exhibit key economic characteristics closest to the
targeted company or transaction. Our policy guidelines require the consistent use of one
or more reliable comparables. "Industry data dumps" are not acceptable, even if
additional statistical analysis is provided using various measures of central tendency
(such as inter-quartile ranges, medians and averages). Statistical tools may to some extent
enhance the reliability of data carefully selected, but cannot enhance inappropriately
selected comparables. Regression analysis too, is only as good as the robustness of the
model employed, the underlying assumptions and the data input.
See also: Canadian Revenue Authority, Information Circular 87-2R (September 27, 1999) at ¶111.
11
This is the US position. See: Treas. Reg. §1.481-1(d)(2).
12
This is the OECD position. See: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, Transfer
Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (July 1995) ¶¶1.15 & 1.16.
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This paper considers a sequence in US and Australian tax cases where arguments
based heavily on database search results were involved. Observations are then extended
to Canada and the UK that have not yet heard precisely similar cases. Because, however,
Canada and the UK follow the OECD Guidelines they would more likely than not follow
the Australian rather than the American lead when faced with determining what value if
any to accord a database dump.
Six cases are considered: E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company v. United
States, Seagate Technology, Inc. v. Commissioner,14 Westreco, Inc. v. Commissioner,15
Roche Products Pty. Ltd v. Commissioner (Australia),16 GlaxoSmithKline v. The Queen,17
and DSG Retail v. HMRC.18
13

(1) DuPont (1978)
DuPont is both an early and an unusual database dump case. The comprehensive
financial database searches in DuPont pre-date modern search engines and digitized
financial databases. The DuPont search was a time consuming manual search. In
addition, DuPont is probably the only case where a one party’s search (the IRS) results in
the other party’s dump (DuPont).
Background
DuPont was the world’s largest chemical company when the case arose. The
Company was seeing a decrease in US sales and a significant increase in both volume
and margins on exports. As a result, the European Common Market19 presented both an
opportunity for greater sales and margins and a threat that DuPont might be locked out.20
DuPont decided to establish Swiss based subsidiary operations that would be both
integral to the US company and complement its existing independent distributor network.
Therefore, this Swiss subsidiary was to be more than a mere sales entity. DuPont’s
success had always been its technical sales service and its indirect sales support. These
services and wholesaling product was what the newly formed Swiss subsidiary would
provide in Europe.21
DuPont intentionally located its subsidiary in a low tax jurisdiction.22 The long
term plan was to use low taxed profits generated in Switzerland, sheltered from US
income tax, to finance its European expansion.23 As a result, DuPont de Nemours
International S. A. (DISA) was established in 1959 and intercompany pricing was set to
13

DuPont, 1978 WL 3449 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div.); 608 F.2d 445 (1979).
102 T.C. 149 (1994).
15
Westreco, T.C. Memo 1992-561.
16
[2008] ATA 639
17
2008 TCC 324 (2008); 2010 FCA 201 (2010)
18
[2009] SC 3056; TC 00001 (March 31, 2009).
19
Established under the Treaty of Rome in 1957
20
DuPont, 1978 WL 3449 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div.) at *4 - *5.
21
Id., at *2.
22
Id., at *9.
23
Id., at *6.
14
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split US and Swiss profits on a 25:75 ratio.24 In addition, the pricing formula guaranteed
the Swiss company profits so that it would never incur losses on any transaction.25
DuPont’s Deficiency
In the statutory notice, the IRS determined deficiencies for tax years 1959 and
1960. In the notice DISA was treated as a distributor and applied a modified resale price
method26, even though the results were calculated differently in 195927 and 1960.28
When trial started, the IRS had also completed additional audits through 1967. Similar
adjustments were proposed for those years and the same calculation method applied as in
the 1960 determination.29
DuPont’s Pricing Defense
DuPont relied on three experts to defend the pricing used on its return30. Each
expert attributing 50 percent of net profits on sales flowing through DISA as appropriate
based on DISA’s marketing function’s efforts.
Under cross-examination, however, all three DuPont experts admitted that their
opinions assumed that DISA took on normal entrepreneurial risks. Each expert was then
made aware that DuPont guaranteed that DISA would be (a) shielded from operational
risk of loss and (b) protected from contract termination risk. Each expert then revised his
opinion and their net profit allocation estimates fell from 50 percent to 10 – 20 percent.
The trial judge subsequently rejected each DuPont experts’ opinion because they
provided no analysis as to how they adjusted for this material difference in risk, despite
their agreement that the difference in risk was material. It had a definite and significant
effect on price.31
24

Id., at *13.
Id., at *13.
26
The Court recognizes this as a “fourth method” DuPont, 608 F.2d 445, 456, n. 28.
27
The margin in 1959 is based on a discount to DISA on its purchases from DuPont.
The discount resulted from the application to DISA of ratios of DuPont’s total selling
expenses (exclusive of advertising) and total administrative expenses to DuPont’s total
sales on a departmental basis. This discount of 5.65 percent was then applied to DISA’s
actual 1959 net sales less commissions to sales representatives …
Id., at *25, at ¶15.
28
The margin in 1960 is based on a statistical compilation of US wholesalers.
This calculation was made by computing the average ratio of net profits to sales for all
United States wholesalers of drugs, chemicals and allied products … that had reportable
taxable income on their United States corporation income tax returns … as compiled by
the Statistics Division of the Internal Revenue Service and recorded in the Source Book
of Statistics of Income.
Id., at *25, at ¶16.
29
Id., at *25, at ¶16.
30
The experts were Professor Robert B. Stobaugh, Jr. (Harvard Business School), Dr. Stanley Miller
(former professor at Harvard Business School and currently a business consultant in London), and Mr.
Martin Bower (director at McKinsey & Company). Stobaugh’s opinion was based on his academic
experience; Miller’s opinion was based on a joint venture between Haloid (Xerox) and J. Arthur Rank that
he worked with; Bower’s opinion was based on his consulting practice at McKinsey. Id., at *78 - *82.
31
Id., at *25, at ¶19.
25
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The Database Search
Neither DuPont nor its experts conducted a financial database search while the
IRS did. Their search results became a critical element in both party’s argument before
the Court.
The IRS started their review with all publicly traded companies required to
register and file their financial statements with the SEC. Three filters were then applied
to narrow the results. The Court agreed that the 32 firms selected had “general functional
similarity”32 with DISA. The trial court noted:
Independent of Dr. Berry [the IRS expert], defendant [IRS] caused a
random compilation to be made of publicly-held firms believed to fall in
any of the three categories mentioned [by Dr. Berry, i.e., management
consulting firms, advertising agencies, and distributors operating in the
US]. Reference was then made to the public files of the Securities and
Exchange Commission in an attempt to obtain pertinent financial and
operational data relative to these companies. … Some firms were
discarded because their 10K filings disclosed that in fact their business did
not fall predominantly within one of the three categories. Most were
eliminated because they had not been subject to Form 10K filing
requirements for a sufficient period of time to constitute a representative
period. With exclusions made only for these reasons, the roster was
reduced to 32 companies33.
DuPont’s Use - IRS database search
The 32 companies selected included 6 management consulting firms, 5
advertising agencies and 21 distributors. The distributors were considered the “most
functionally comparable to DISA.”34
DuPont selected all 21 distributors and further refined the IRS search. Fifteen
companies were removed, leaving it with the 6 distributors that “most closely” resembled
DISA. DuPont then argued that these companies were comparables and that their
markup percentages verified the appropriate DuPont / DISA pricing under a resale price
methodology.35
Dr. Berry’s Use - IRS database search
The IRS expert, Professor Charles Berry, also used the 32 firms the IRS identified
in their database search. Rather than using them to determine an arm’s length price for
the DuPont / DISA transactions, Professor Berry used them to support the original
Statutory Notice of Determination’s validity. Dr. Berry did not consider the 32 firms to

32

DuPont, 608 F.2d 445, 452, n. 16 (1979).
DuPont, 1978 WL 3449 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div.) at *98, at ¶118.
34
Id., at *101, at ¶123.
35
The markup percentages were 38%, 33%, 26%, 23%, 20.5% and 19.5%. DISA’s markup was at the midpoint (26%). DuPont, 608 F.2d 445, 452, n. 16.
33
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be comparables in the sense employed in the regulations36 nor did he use them to
advance a specific transfer pricing methodology.37
Applying an average gross income / total cost ratio to the 6 management
consulting firms (108.3%), 5 advertising firms (123.9%), and 21 distributors (129.3%),
Dr. Berry demonstrated that the original IRS allocation brought DISA’s extraordinary
336% and 397.1% ratios much closer to the results expected from a company like DISA
(108.6% and 179.3%).
Both the trial judge and the full Court of Claims strongly embraced Professor
Berry’s core analytical point. If a service provider like DISA also functions as a
distributor, its gross profit level cannot be compared with other service provider /
distributors if significant service based selling expenses are reportable as operational
expenses. This is true because DuPont rather than DISA is bearing the cost for those
operational expenses.
[W]e agree with the trial judge and defendant's expert that, in general,
what a business spends to provide services is a reasonable indication of the
magnitude of those services, and because plaintiff has not rebutted that
normal presumption in this case, we cannot view these six companies as
having made resales similar to DISA's. They may have made gross profits
comparable to DISA's but their selling costs, reflecting the greater scale of
their services or efforts, were much higher in each instance.38
This point is driven home when the court applied Professor Berry’s ratios to the
six DuPont selected distributors from the IRS database search. When considered from
the “markup percentages” perspective, DISA was squarely at the range mid-point for
these companies.39 Under Professor Berry’s analysis, however, DISA is a remote outlier
and the reason for this difference is clear. DuPont, rather than DISA bears the cost for
most DISA’s service based selling expenses.40
Database Searches Provide Results, Not Comparables
DuPont assumed that the IRS search found comparables, but it did not.41 Neither
the IRS during its search or through its expert Dr. Berry nor DuPont itself provided the
Court with any comparability analysis. The 32 firms were not comparables.
Beyond the most general showing that this group [of distributors], like
DISA, distributed manufactured goods, there is nothing in the record
showing the degree of similarity called for by the regulation. No data
36

Id.
DuPont, 1978 WL 3449 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div.) at *97.
38
Id., at 452.
39
Supra, note 35.
40
Id. at 452. When operating expenses are taken as a percent of net sales, the six distributors report 27.5%,
20.5%, 20.5%, 20.0%, 16.0% and 11.5%. DISA reports 6.7% (or 7.1%). The trial court calculated DISA’s
ratio at 6.7%; the full Court of Claims calculated it at 7.1%. The differences are not explained.
41
DuPont argued that by performing the search and offering it in evidence, the IRS conceded that the 32
selected firms were comparables. The IRS objected, and the court agreed with the IRS. DuPont, 608 F.2d
445, 452, n. 16.
37
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exist to establish similarity of products (with associated marketing costs),
comparability of functions, or parallel geographic (and economic) market
conditions.42
Without performing a comparability analysis on the IRS search results, DuPont’s
presentation to the Court was a classic database dump. This dump occurred before
modern technology existed where on-line databases could use powerful engines to search
and filter significant data in just a few moments. Despite this limitation, the results were
the same as they would be today. The courts rejected database dumps masquerading as
comparables.
In addition, the US Treasury Regulations in place at the time compelled rejection.
Adjustments were mandated, rather than optional43, whenever material differences
between controlled and uncontrolled parties have a definite and reasonably ascertainable
effect on price. DuPont made no adjustments for operating expenses or risks. The need
for adjustment was very clear with respect to risk. As the trial court noted:
Evidence offered by plaintiff’s own experts in this case specifically
identified exposure to such entrepreneurial risks as the risk of operating
loss as a circumstance that has a definite and reasonably ascertainable
effect on price. Findings 102, & 103.
It is not suggested and it does not appear that any of the 32 entities
evaluated by Dr. Berry bore any less than all of the risks of loss or failure
normally associated with the conduct of an independent, profit-making
enterprise. By virtue of its pricing and other arrangements with plaintiff,
DISA was not subject to those risks. Findings 78-80, 82, & 84.44
DuPont was decided on the presumptive correctness in the statutory notice.45 The
taxpayer could not prevail with its resale price method because the potential comparables
identified in the IRS database search differed materially from the controlled parties. The
differences affected price, adjustments were required, and no adjustments were made.
(2) Seagate (1994)
Seagate presents a classic fact pattern where the comparable uncontrolled price
(CUP) studies46 should have been used to resolve the transfer pricing questions. Here,
42

Id., at 451.
Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(e)(3)(ix) (1968) (available among other places as an appendix in DuPont, 608 F.2d
445, 460) (emphasis added).
In determining an arm's length price appropriate adjustment must be made to reflect any
material differences between the uncontrolled purchases and resales used as the basis for
the calculation of the appropriate markup percentage and the resales of property involved
in the controlled sale. The differences referred to in this subdivision are those differences
in functions or circumstances which have a definite and reasonably ascertainable effect
on price.
44
DuPont, 1978 WL 3449 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div.) at *101, at ¶124.
45
DuPont, 608 F.2d 445, 461 (Judge Nichols, concurring).
46
Seagate, 102 T.C. 149, 239 (1994). The court notes:
43
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both the government and taxpayer representatives sought “simpler” solutions for reasons
having to do with adequate taxpayer records and difficulties in reconstructing records
after the fact. Unfortunately, however, these solutions did not work. On most issues, the
court was left with a record where its decision was based on its “best estimate.”47
The IRS used a database search in part of its case.48 The search was designed to
find a gross margin that would determine an arms length price under a resale price
method for completed disk drives Seagate Singapore sold to Seagate Scotts Valley. The
IRS’s method was rejected because it only offered the court a database search. It did not
prove that the search results had uncovered comparable companies. The court believed
that numerous adjustments were needed to arrive at what were considered comparables.
The IRS did not make them and the court did not have the record to make them on its
own.
Background
Seagate Scotts Valley was a leading US computer hard disk drives and component
parts manufacturer. Seagate sold 15 disk drive models to a wide ranging OEMs and
distributors.
Prior to establishing Seagate Singapore, all disk drive manufacturing occurred in
California. On July 30, 1982 a wholly owned subsidiary was established in Singapore to
manufacturing high volume, low-end commodity disk drives. Market prices were falling
rapidly and market competition was intense. Seagate was searching for a way to further
reduce costs by utilizing a 10-year tax holiday in Singapore.
Once established, the Singapore subsidiary grew rapidly. Volumes increased
from 125,919 units in 1984 to 3,413,463 in 1987. Beginning with 50 employees, Seagate
became Singapore’s second largest employer in 1987 with 8,067 workers. Beginning
with component manufacturing in 1982, Seagate Singapore only one year later was also
engaged in complete disk drive manufacture. Seagate Singapore sold either to Scotts
Valley or to independent parties that placed orders through Scotts Valley. Internal CUPs
were therefore potentially available in all product lines for all years.
Initially, Seagate set intercompany prices at the standard cost to manufacture in
the US. Transfer prices were later set at the standard cost to manufacture in Singapore
plus a 25% markup.49
Third party sales of disk drives were substantial in frequency and volume. Seagate
Singapore sold the same disk drives models to Seagate Scotts Valley that it sold to third
party customers. It would appear reasonable to conclude that the comparable
uncontrolled price method should be appropriate for the instant case. The record,
however, does not establish whether the circumstances surrounding any of the third party
transactions were sufficiently similar to the circumstances involved in the controlled
sales.
47
Id., at 195 and 230.
48
There are nine separate transfer pricing issues in Seagate. Only the IRS argument involving
intercompany sales for completed disk drives involves a database search.
49
Id., at 196.
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Seagate’s Deficiencies
In the statutory notice, the price for completed disk drives50 Seagate Singapore
sold to Seagate Scotts Valley were set at a 20% discount from Seagate Scotts Valley’s
resale price to independent parties.51
The IRS had significant difficulty supporting this adjustment in their statutory
notice. Given how the taxpayer’s accounting records were kept, it was not possible for
auditors to isolate the costs for Singapore manufactured drives sold to Seagate Scotts
Valley from identical US manufactured ones sold directly into the market52. As a result
rather than being able to cleanly determine the deficiency for completed disk drives, the
IRS “backed into” it by aggregating this adjustment with a related adjustment for
marketing services.53 In the statutory notice, the “marketing services” adjustment was set
at 20% of Seagate Singapore’s “total adjusted sales”.54
Seagate’s pricing defense
Two expert witnesses defended Seagate’s completed disk drive pricing. Dr. Gary
E. Holdren prepared a CUP based pricing study in which he compared the prices and sale
terms by disk drive model for disk drives Seagate Singapore sold to unrelated third
parties and those sold to Seagate Scotts Valley55.
The court rejected Dr. Holdren’s study because he did “… not establish that the
circumstances involved in the uncontrolled sales are identical to the circumstances
involved in the controlled sales.”56 Adjustments were needed but not made for
differences in sales volume, market size and competitive landscape, geographic market,
and timing for sales.57 In addition, weighted average rather than actual sales prices were
used in the analysis.58

50

All totaled, there were nine transfer pricing issues in this case.
Id., at 201 (the component parts adjustment was determined to be the cost of manufacture (in Singapore)
plus 15%). Id., at 176.
52
Disk drives are commodity products. Disk drives manufactured at Seagate Scotts Valley are
indistinguishable from the same disk drive model manufactured at Seagate Singapore. Internal records did
not track manufacturing origin for disk drives. It was not possible to follow a specific Singapore
manufactured disk drive sold from Singapore to Scotts Valley then on to an identified third party.
53
A marketing services adjustment was due because Seagate Scotts Valley provided marketing services for
all Seagate disk drives. Seagate Scotts Valley facilitated Seagate Singapore’s substantial direct third party
sales. These direct sales frequently exceeded 50% of all Seagate Singapore sales. Id., at 202.
54
Total adjusted sales included: (a) Singapore sales to third parties, (b) amounts Singapore actually
received from intercompany disk drive sales, and (c) a price adjustment applied to the figure at (b). Id., at
203.
55
Id., at 203 – 213.
56
Id., at 229.
57
Id., at 229 (in a falling, highly competitive commodity market the circumstances of the sale greatly
determine the price, and neither a transaction at a specific point in time, nor an average of all transactions
will provide comparability).
58
Id., at 230 (indicating a wide variation in prices and listing one example from each year: the ST412 in
1984 [$440 to $343.83]; ST212 in 1985 [$450 to 219.43]; ST 225 in 1986 [$1,334.67 to $246]; ST225 in
1987 [$341.50 to $211.00])
51
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A second expert, Dr. Daniel P. Broadhurst, used average costs and prices from Dr.
Holdren’s report to support Seagate’s pricing under a resale price method.59 Once again,
the court rejected this conclusion. Because Broadhurst based his report on Holdren’s
data, it now suffered from Holdren’s failings. That is, no required adjustments were made
for material differences and average rather than actual sales prices were used.60
The IRS’s Argument – RSP with a Database Dump
The IRS used a resale price method and two expert witnesses Dr. Grant M.
Clowery and Dr. Daniel J. Frisch to support the proposed deficiency.
Dr. Clowery performed an accounting analysis for Seagate Scotts Valley that sets
out the gross profit earned on complete disk drive sales.61 The key calculation involved
determining the cost of sales. Gross profit is segmented between disk drives Seagate
Scotts Valley manufactured and those Seagate Singapore manufactured.62 Direct and
indirect costs63 were allocated based on relative sales values64.
The second expert, Dr. Daniel J. Frisch, looked at just the complete disk drive
distribution function at Seagate Scotts Valley. This is an operation that includes both
disk drives manufactured in Scotts Valley and those manufactured in Singapore. Frisch’s
report compared Dr. Clowery’s calculated gross profit margin for Seagate Scotts Valley
with gross profit margins for ten independent distributors he deems to be comparable.
Database search
Because, “Dr. Frisch could not locate any independent distributor that performed
precisely the same functions under the same circumstances as Seagate Scotts Valley,
…”65 he searched for comparable companies in databases and hoped to extract from the
search an analytically sound gross margin that could be used in a resale price calculation.
Dr. Frisch concluded that, taken as a whole, for the fiscal years ended
1984 through 1987, Seagate Scotts Valley earned a negative gross profit
margin from reselling the Seagate Singapore-produced disk drives. In
contrast, the 10 companies experienced average gross profit margins
ranging between 10 and 25 percent of sales over the same 4-year period.
Consequently, Dr. Frisch concluded that Seagate Singapore's transfer
59

Id., at 213 – 217.
Id., at 239.
61
Seagate did not segregate income on its balance sheets in a manner that easily allowed completed disk
drive sales to be segmented from other income streams (notable component sales).
62
Id., at 217 (Clowery used Seagate Scotts Valley’s monthly cost of sales journals that distinguished
various costs incurred locally from “Singapore materials” costs).
63
The indirect costs of sales were Seagate Scotts Valley costs incurred attributable to disk drives sold that
were manufactured at both the Scotts Valley and at the Singapore facility.
Next, also on the basis of relative sales value, Dr. Clowery allocated to the disk drives
manufactured by Seagate Scotts Valley and Seagate Singapore, Seagate Scotts Valley's
indirect costs of sales, after certain adjustments including adjustments to conform the
total indirect costs with the indirect costs of sales reflected on Seagate Scotts Valley’s
consolidated income statement. (Id., at 219).
64
Id., at 218.
65
Id., at 221.
60
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prices to Seagate Scotts Valley for disk drives should be adjusted so that
Seagate Scotts Valley's gross profit margin for each year is at least equal
to the gross margin earned by Micro D, which for each such year recorded
the lowest gross margin of the companies he identified as comparable to
Seagate Scotts Valley.66
Dr. Frisch’s database search was more high-tech than the IRS’s search conducted
in DuPont. It had more digital filters but that did not make it any more analytical. Dr.
Frisch searched under the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes 5045 (computers
and computer peripheral equipment and software wholesalers) and 5065 (electronic parts
and equipment wholesalers). Within this group67 he applied the following filters to select
companies that:
(a) should be a significant disk drive distributor
(b) does not engage in manufacturing as a significant activity
(c) engages in no (or a trivial amount of) retail level activity
(d) was an going concern during Seagate’s fiscal years 1984 through 1987
(e) neither started up nor ceased operations during those years that
(f) issued public SEC statements with financial data for at least part of this period
Dr. Frisch’s search identified ten potential comparables. He admitted to the court
that there were at least seven significant differences between this group and Seagate
Scotts Valley. He deemed only two differences, inventory levels and accounts receivable,
to be material and made adjustments for them. The court, however, was not convinced
and pointed to search assumptions that covered over fundamental differences it felt even
a casual analysis would notice.
Assumption – Clowery’s accounting matched that of the comparables
Central to Dr. Frisch’s report is the assumption that gross margin percentages Dr.
Clowery calculated for Seagate Scotts Valley were the same as or used the same
accounting rules as gross margin calculations made for the ten potential comparables.
The court notes that Dr. Frisch assumes: (1) that the Form 10-K SEC reports conform to
Dr. Clowery’s calculations for Seagate Scotts Valley; (2) that all ten firms follow a full
absorption costing method for determining cost of goods sold including inventoriable and
non-inventoriable expenses in cost of goods sold; and (3) that the ten potential
comparables allocate to cost of goods sold the same costs that Dr. Clowery allocates
when he determined cost of goods sold for Seagate Scotts Valley.
Assumption – Distribution Can be Segmented from Manufacturing
More damaging still is the problem that both Drs. Clowery and Frisch have with
segmenting the distribution and manufacturing functions within Seagate Scotts Valley.
Dr. Frisch conceded that:
… if the costs of sales Dr. Clowery allocated to the Seagate Singaporeproduced disk drives includes an extensive amount of manufacturing
66

Id., at 224.
The court notes that the group was “… generally [comprised of] Seagate Scotts Valley’s customers.” Id.,
at 221.
67
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costs, then Dr. Frisch’s selected companies would no longer be
comparable since he would be comparing a manufacturer and reseller to a
resellers only. [And] Dr. Clowery conceded that he possibly allocated
some manufacturing expenses to the cost of sales for the disk drives
Seagate Scotts Valley purchased from Seagate Singapore. … [And the
Court] conclude[s] that, in all probability, Dr. Clowery allocated a
significant portion of Seagate Scotts Valley’s manufacturing costs to the
cost of sales for the Seagate Singapore-produced disk drives.68
In short, the Tax Court considered the Frisch report to be a database dump. There
were too many assumptions and comparability adjustments were simply not made. The
search itself was being offered as a substitute for meaningful comparability analysis.
Thus, the court held that there were no comparables because there was no analysis.
…we are not convinced that the gross profit percentages Dr, Frisch
calculated for the 10 companies he selected as comparables constitute a
comparable markup percentage for Seagate Scotts Valley’s distribution
functions relating to the Seagate Singapore-produced disk drives. …
respondent has failed to convince us that the transfer prices propounded by
Dr. Frisch for the completed disk drives are reasonable.69
(3) Westreco (1992)
Westreco presents a much simpler transfer pricing fact pattern than either
DuPont or Seagate. This case is important because it contrasts what happens when
comparability analysis developed from a good database search is set against a database
search that simply dumps its results on the court without analysis.
70

The Westreco business plan is based mostly on providing contract research
services for its foreign parent Nestec. Minimal technical services were, however,
provided to ultimate parent company Nestlé Foods Corp., Inc. In this case, only the
Westreco / Nestec service agreement was under scrutiny.71 The question is simple. What
is the appropriate fee for the services Westreco provided to Nestec?
Background
Nestlé, S.A. is a publicly owned Swiss company engaged in worldwide research,
development, manufacturing, and marketing for processed food products. R&D is critical
to its success, and Nestec is Nestlé’s dedicated R&D subsidiary.
Nestec operated through six divisions and seventeen technological development
centers located in more than ten countries, most using the suffix “reco” in their name to
68

Id., at 236.
Id., at 236.
70
Westreco, T.C. Memo 1992-561
71
Because there are two lines of service and the IRS decides to only adjust the major line (services to
Nestec) some unnecessary complexity is brought into the case. The Westreco/Nestec services need to be
segmented from the Westreco / Nestle Foods Corp. services. Although the statutory notice is drafted as if
this segmentation has been performed, neither the salary multiplier method the audit team used nor the
analysis the IRS experts performed at trial make this distinction.
69
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denote themselves as a “research company.”72 Westreco, Inc. is Nestec’s U.S. subsidiary
engaged in contract research at Nestec’s direction.
Westreco had two facilities: (1) a pilot plant and laboratory in Marysville, Ohio
that focused on research issues related to instant coffee and instant tea, and (2) a
technology facility in Milford, Connecticut engaged in technological development and
provided technology assistance to related parties73. Westreco’s fee for services was
determined on a sliding scale cost-plus basis:
Nestec compensated petitioner for its R and D services on a cost-plus
basis. Nestec was contractually obligated to reimburse petitioner for
certain expenses plus a profit equal to 7.5 percent on the first $350,000 of
such expenses, 5 percent on the next $1,500,000 of expenses, and 3.5
percent of petitioner's expenses there- after. The reimbursable expenses
included all salaries, rent, consulting fees, raw materials, equipment, and
administrative expenses, but not taxes. The contract could be terminated
by either party on a year-by-year basis, subject to 3 months' written
notice.74
Westreco’s deficiency
The IRS determined deficiencies for 1978 through 1982 based on a “salary
multiplier”, a measure commonly used to determine compensation in large construction
and engineering firms.75 This unconventional method was shown to be defective76 and
was therefore not relied upon at trial.
Westreco’s CUP pricing defense
Westreco’s expert, Dr. Clark Chandler, compared Westreco to four companies
that each provided contract research and engineering consulting services as their core
business function.77 We are not told about the search process other than it identified
these four firms. The search probably was conducted through an online database search.
One is left with the impression that we are not told much about the search itself because
the search is not what is important. What we are told about in considerable detail is how
Chandler sets out his proof that these companies are comparable to Westreco.
The Treasury regulations identify five comparability factors: functions, risks,
contractual terms, economic conditions, and property or service78. The OECD Guidelines
72

Id., at *1.
Id., at *2.
74
Id., at *9.
75
Id., at *11.
76
Not only was Westreco not functionally comparable to a traditional engineering firm (Id., at *18), but if
the multiplier is used against a correct wage base for hours actually billed (without administrative costs,
fringe benefits, sick leave, vacation, holiday and incentive pay), then the salary multiplier method indicates
that Westreco was over-paid rather than underpaid. (Id., at *17). In addition, the statutory notice used an
un-segmented base that included the salaries for researchers working on Nestle Foods projects, even though
the adjustment was made only on the fees for Nestec projects (Id., at *17).
77
The companies are Arthur D. Little, Inc.; Artisan Industries, Inc.; Gulf Machinery Company, Inc.; and
Knechtel Research Sciences, Inc. (Id., at *18).
78
Treas. Reg. §1.481-1(d).
73

14
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1926897

also specify the same factors. While there is a slight difference in how Treasury and the
OECD express these factors, for all practical purposes the same factors are involved79.
Rigorous analysis is needed whenever a comparability factor or circumstances
involving a controlled transaction may affect the arm’s length result under a transfer
pricing method80. Three comparability factors are critical for Dr. Chandler who analyses
(1) business relations with clients, (2) financial comparability, and (3) economic and
business risks (client, general business, research, and downstream market risks).81 In
each category, Dr. Chandler contrasts Westreco with all four firms selected and explains
why Westreco is comfortably positioned within this group82.
After Dr. Chandler is convinced that Westreco “fits” in this group, he confirms
his assessment with four financial ratios: (1) operating income as a percent of net sales;
(2) operating income as a percent of operating assets; (3) pretax income as a percent of
net sales; and (4) pretax income as a percent of total assets.83 Once again Westreco “fits”
in this group and Dr. Chandler concluded:
…from the data analyzed, that Westreco's profits were likely to be
somewhat lower than those of the four comparable corporations because
two of them (Artisan and Gulf) developed commercially viable technology
on their own account and owned the rights to that technology. Westreco's
profits were relatively more consistent from year to year than other
comparables because it faced lower risks. The comparable corporations
would be expected to realize higher average profits to compensate for their
higher risks. Accordingly, Dr. Chandler opined that the fees received by
petitioner from Nestec were comparable to such income from services
performed for unrelated corporations.84
IRS’s Cost-Plus Argument – a Database Dump
The IRS abandons its salary multiplier argument at trial and uses Dr. Dennis
Carlton and Dr. Richard Leftwich as expert witnesses to support a cost-plus
methodology. A database dump used to determine the “plus”.
Drs. Carlton and Leftwich consulted the Standard & Poor’s Computstat Services,
Inc. database for publicly traded companies, indexed according to SIC codes. While SIC
code number 8711 (engineering services) and 8731 (commercial physical and biological
research) were selected, Drs. Carlton and Leftwich did not filter the resulting SIC code

79

The OCED Guidelines consider functions and risks together, listing business strategies as a fifth factor.
Under US regulations, business and market share strategies are a “special circumstance.” Thus the five
factors are not set down identically but for all practical purposed they are the same. Treas. Reg. §1.4811(d)(1) and OECD Guidelines (2010) ¶1.36; (1995) ¶1.17.
80
Treas. Reg. §1.481-1(d) and OECD Guidelines (2010) ¶1.33; (1995) ¶1.15.
81
The two other factors (functions and property or service) are handled in the general description of the
companies Chandler selects.
82
Id., at *19.
83
Id., at *20.
84
Id., at *20.
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data. The experts’ testimony under cross-examination showed their failure to take into
account certain attributes for these comparables including:
(a) merging during the relevant years
i. operating the same or similar line of business
ii. facing unique risk
iii. owning particular intangible assets
iv. owning particular assets
(b) relevant trade level
i. exact functions performed
(c) individual customers
i. involvement in technological development
The court concludes that “the most important fallacy in the report of Drs. Carlton
and Leftwich is the lack of comparability between the petitioner and the 15 enumerated
corporations.”85 The court was particularly concerned about the proposed comparables’
patent and trademark ownership, high number of government contractors, Westreco’s
guaranteed profitability, and using Compustat data before interest and taxes. Westreco’s
profitability, on the other hand, was considered after these amounts were deducted.
The IRS’s cost-plus approach was based entirely on a database dump. No
comparability analysis was performed and the court rejected the IRS’s cost-plus results.
Drs. Carlton and Leftwich did nothing to ensure that the functions of the
corporations in reality approximated petitioner's business operations. Dr.
Carlton, at trial, emphatically stated that comparability is assured when
relying solely upon SIC codes because the codes “naturally group firms
that do similar things together.”86
(4) Roche (2008)
Australia’s first substantive transfer pricing case, Roche Products Pty. Ltd v.
Commissioner (Australia),87 was a dispute about a deficiency derived entirely from
database dumps. The court rejected these search results because the studies lacked any
analysis that would prove comparability.
Roche is important because Australia still follows the 1995 OECD Guidelines.88
The court arrives at the same conclusion about database dumps as the US courts came to
85

Id., at *24.
Id., at *24 (emphasis in original).
87
[2008] ATA 639.
88
Australia follows the OECD Guidelines more closely in cases involving a double tax treaty modeled on
the OECD. Unlike the UK where the Guidelines are expressly adopted in the statutes, Australia follows the
Guidelines because it is the “best evidence of international practice.” The Federal Court of Australia
recently observed (comparing the Australian and UK adherence to the Guidelines):
[T]he Sch 28AA regime [in the UK], by virtue of para 2 requires effect to be given to the
Transfer Pricing Guidelines as they apply to treaties following the OECD model. The
incorporation is not wholesale: it merely requires the schedule as a whole to be
interpreted in such a way as secures consistency between para 1 of the schedule and the
OECD model in accordance with the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. There is no
incorporation of the OECD model in s 770 [in Australia]. But it seems to us that in
86
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under the 1968 regulations. The searches were completely rejected because they do not
prove comparability. While the 1994 regulations relaxed US comparability standards, a
jurisdiction following the 1995 OECD Guidelines would more likely follow the courts
footsteps in DuPont, Seagate, and Westreco than would a US court applying the 1994
regulations. The current US rules do not reject bad comparables, they just reduce their
reliability.
The rules on comparability adjustments were clear in the 1968 regulations. If
there were material differences between controlled and uncontrolled transactions, then
adjustments must be made to the referenced uncontrolled parties or the proposed
comparables are rejected. This alignment with controlled parties89 was the regulatory
linchpin in the DuPont, Seagate, and Westreco decisions. The 1995 OECD Guidelines
adopt the same rule that these adjustments must be made90.
The 1994 regulations changed this rule. Now if adjustments cannot be made, the
proposed comparables need not be rejected. Instead, the analysis’ reliability is reduced.91
determining the arm's length price, the approach of the OECD model is a useful aid
which we should apply in the absence of any other guidance as they are the best evidence
of international thinking on the topic.
SNF (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation, [2010] ATC 20-190; [2010] FCA 635.
89
Treas. Reg. §1.482-2(e)(3)(ix) (1968) (available among other places as an appendix in DuPont, 608 F.2d
445, 460) (emphasis added).
In determining an arm's length price appropriate adjustment must be made to reflect any
material differences between the uncontrolled purchases and resales used as the basis for
the calculation of the appropriate markup percentage and the resales of property involved
in the controlled sale. The differences referred to in this subdivision are those differences
in functions or circumstances which have a definite and reasonably ascertainable effect
on price.
90
OECD, Guidelines (1995) at ¶¶1.15 & 1.16 (emphasis added).
To be comparable means that none of the differences (if any) between the situations
being compared could materially affect the condition being examined in the methodology
(e.g. price or margin), or that reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate
the effect of any such differences. … In all cases adjustments must be made to account
for differences between the controlled and uncontrolled situations that would
significantly affect the price charged or return required by independent enterprises.
Therefore, in no event can unadjusted industry average returns themselves establish arm's
length conditions.
91
Treas. Reg. §1.481-1(d)(2) (emphasis added).
In order to be considered comparable to a controlled transaction, an uncontrolled
transaction need not be identical to the controlled transaction, but must be sufficiently
similar that it provides a reliable measure of an arm's length result. If there are material
differences between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions, adjustments must be
made if the effect of such differences on prices or profits can be ascertained with
sufficient accuracy to improve the reliability of the results. For purposes of this section, a
material difference is one that would materially affect the measure of an arm's length
result under the method being applied. If adjustments for material differences cannot be
made, the uncontrolled transaction may be used as a measure of an arm's length result,
but the reliability of the analysis will be reduced. Generally, such adjustments must be
made to the results of the uncontrolled comparable and must be based on commercial
practices, economic principles, or statistical analyses. The extent and reliability of any
adjustments will affect the relative reliability of the analysis. See §1.482-1(c)(1) (Best
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The 2010 OECD Guidelines half-way responded to this change. While the 2010 OECD
Guidelines are not in full agreement with the US rule, an adjustment is only required
where possible to improve the comparison’s reliability.92
Background
Roche Holdings Limited is the Basel, Switzerland based multinational
pharmaceutical company that sells and manufactures pharmaceuticals globally. Roche
Products Pty. Ltd. (Roche Australia) is the Australian subsidiary that develops marketing
outlets in Australia operating through Prescription, Consumer, and Diagnostic divisions.
The Prescription Division is the most substantial division, marketing Roche
prescription pharmaceuticals and performing limited research and development. The
Consumer Division sells over-the-counter pharmaceuticals and the Diagnostic Division
sells equipment and preparations used in hospitals and medical laboratories. The
Diagnostic division had never been successful.
Most pharmaceutical products were obtained from Roche Holdings Limited in
Basel, although some were obtained from the Roche Singapore subsidiary. Both tax
treaties follow the OECD model. Article 9 in the Australian / Swiss and Article 6 in the
Australian / Singapore double tax treaties are implicated in the case. The transfer pricing
adjustments were also supported under applicable tax statute, specifically Division 13 of
the ITAA 1936.
The Commissioner determined that the intercompany prices Roche Australia paid
were not at arm’s length. The prices were deemed excessive and that profits were being
transferred from Australia through the pricing.
Decision
The court was persuaded that a reasonable gross margin for prescription
pharmaceutical would be 40% and applied a resale price method with the same markup
for all years in issue (1993 – 2003). The court reduced the assessment from
approximately A$110 million to A$45 million. Only the Prescription Division was
implicated in the appeal. The Commissioner’s deficiency related to the Consumer and
Diagnostic Divisions was not upheld.

method rule). In any event, unadjusted industry average re- turns themselves cannot
establish arm's length results.
92
OECD, Guidelines at ¶¶1.33 & 1.35 (2010) (emphasis added)
To be comparable means that none of the differences (if any) between the situations
being compared could materially affect the condition being examined in the methodology
(e.g. price or margin), or that reasonably accurate adjustments can be made to eliminate
the effect of any such differences. … Where there are differences between the situations
being compared that could materially affect the comparison, comparability adjustments
must be made, where possible, to improve the reliability of the comparison. Therefore, in
no event can unadjusted industry average returns themselves establish arm’s length
conditions.
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The court rejected both parties transfer pricing arguments, although it found the
Roche Australia economist, Dr. Daniel Frisch’s submitted data while limited in scope to
be persuasive. Dr. Frisch’s report presented a CUP analysis based on internal
comparable data he had access to for several pharmaceutical companies. The
government was unaware on audit about this information. The ATO supported their
assessment with experts Dr. Deloris Wright and Dr. Brian Becker. This paper focuses on
the deficiency determination and the Roche database dumps defense, passing on other
issues addressed in the case.
The Roche Deficiency – Multiple Database Dumps
The ATO engaged Dr. Wright as their expert witness to assist in developing the
deficiency notice and defend their deficiency at trial. Altogether Dr. Wright conducted
seven fairly comprehensive searches, in no case does the court indicate that she has
presented it with anything more analytical than the search results themselves.
For the Prescription Division, Dr. Wright determined that a resale price method
was most appropriate for the distribution and marketing functions while a cost-plus
method was best for the clinical trial management and secondary manufacturing
functions. A resale price method was also applied to the Consumer and Diagnostic
Divisions.
It is important to put into context the database dumps involved in this case
because the quantity of data involved has a role to play in the suggestion that the search
itself can be substituted for comparability analysis. Roche Australia may well represent
substituting “quantity for quality” that the OECD warns about.93 Roughly speaking, the
seven searches are summarized as follows:
(1) Prescription Division

(a) Clinical trials - Three commercial databases are consulted yielding
591 companies from which 580 are discarded.94 Eleven companies
met Dr. Wright’s criteria and five were added from other searches.95
Fourteen of the remaining sixteen companies were UK firms.
Markups for these firms ranged from 24.8% to (20.0%) with a 3.7% to
11.3% interquartile range and a 7.9% median.
(b) Secondary manufacturing - In this search 1,440 companies were
identified as potential comparables. From this potential pool,
unspecified filters were applied to eliminate all but one remaining
French firm and one Canadian firm. Because only the French firm had
markup figures for the whole period, it became the exclusive referent
to determine the interquartile range. Markups for these firms ranged
93

OECD Guidelines (2010) supra note 2, at ¶¶1.51 & 3.33.
The court notes, “She gave very few details of this process.” Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶65.
95
There is no indication as to what the criteria was that narrowed the search, other than these firms are
“contract research organizations which specialize in the management of clinical trials, [which] … is not, of
course, what Roche Australia did.” There is also no indication what the “other searches” are that provide
the additional comparables. Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶¶65 & 67.
94
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from 2.6% to 30.2% with a 10.4% to 17.9% interquartile range and a
12.6% median. The court notes that, “Dr. Wright accepts [the single
French company] as a comparable”96.
(c) Distribution and marketing - A search for Australia companies was
fruitless so Dr. Wright went to seventeen other countries that she felt
were comparable to Australia and again she found no companies.97 As
a consequence, Dr. Wright segmented this function into its component
parts: distribution, marketing, and selling:
i. Distribution. Finding no independent pharmaceutical distributors
in Australia, Dr. Wright went to the seventeen comparable
countries and identified 1,080 companies. All but twenty-five
were rejected for unspecified reasons and to this amount twentyfour were added from an unspecified prior search. An interquartile
gross margin range was identified which after adjustments98
yielded a gross margin range that was converted to operating
margins (because a total cost plus method was being applied). The
gross margin for these firms ranged from 14.3% to 6.8% with a
1.0% to 2.6% interquartile range with a 1.6% median99.
ii. Marketing. This search involved eighteen countries including
Australia. Dr. Wright found 265 companies, rejecting 258 leaving
seven – six from the US and one from Canada. The search
revealed a 2.9% to 23% markup range with a 9.0% to 15.9%
interquartile range and a 13.1%.median
iii. Selling. Dr. Wright’s initial search this time found 1,069
companies, all located in the US. These companies provided
various services to the pharmaceutical industry including
outsourced sales services. There was apparently no further
filtering for this group. The markup range was from (1.7%) to
16.5% with a 3.3% to 10.3% interquartile range and a 6.6%
median. In this case Dr. Wright selected a markup at the top of the
range “because I believe it to be the appropriate markup” without
further analysis.100

96

Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶69 (if so, the court observes, “… a very large markup can be found in a
company operating at arm’s length.”)
97
The court notes that what Dr. Wright was looking for:
she could not find companies which carried out functions sufficiently comparable to the
activities of Roche Australia, partly because they did not carry out the detailing or direct
marketing through medical practitioners.
Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶70.
98
Dr. Wright indicated that adjustments for: (a) carrying costs of inventory, (b) net accounts receivable,
and (c) functional intensity were needed yet only the last adjustment (c) was made. For adjustments (a) and
(b), Dr. Wright had no data to make them and did not do so. Dr. Wright indicated that these adjustments
were “usually small” but in this case “could be quite large.” Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶73.
99
The gross margin range was 7.7% to 13.4% with a 7.2% to 9.2% interquartile range a 8.3% median.
Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶74.
100
Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶77.
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Dr. Wright aggregated these Prescription Division search results to find a 43.2%
to 45.8% arm’s length gross margin range with a 44.4%.median.
(2) Consumer Division. Limited to only a division segment (Category 1 products)
Dr. Wright searched for independent distributors involving fully finished
unpatented products in Australia. She found none and for unspecified reasons
resorted to the database search spanning seventeen comparable countries used in
the distribution function under the Prescription Division. Unspecified
adjustments were made to the search yielding 3.9% to 6.9% operating margins
with a 5.6% median101.
(3) Diagnostics Division. Dr. Wright confronted similar problems with the
Diagnostic Division as she did with the Consumer Division. Finding no
comparables in Australia and nor in the seventeen other countries, she resorted to
searching under the distribution function within the Prescription Division where
Dr. Wright found 10 of the 49 pharmaceutical product distributors to be
diagnostic product distributors. Once again, unspecified adjustments were made
to the search yielding 4.5% to 9.0% operating margins with a 6.7% median102.
The court’s response to database dumps
The court was clearly frustrated with Dr. Wright’s database dumps, confused by
the methods Dr. Wright used and concerned that Dr. Wright’s experience with American
(as opposed to Australian) transfer pricing biases her conclusions. While Dr. Wright
indicated that traditional methods were used, the court felt that fact profit methods were
used. Also, Australian rules under the 1995 OECD Guidelines were not the same as the
American rules in effect.
(1) Confusion in methods employed. The Court notes that Dr. Wright stated that
she used traditional resale price or a cost-plus method103. The court declares that this is
not what Dr. Wright does. “The method used by Dr. Wright is not really a transaction
method but rather a profit method, with all their disadvantages”104.
The real concern should not be with the methods used105 but whether or not Dr.
Wright was dealing with comparables. There was no evidence as to Dr Wright’s efforts
to prove comparability with anything more analytical than the raw search data.
In the end, no method can withstand scrutiny if it is not based on comparables and
comparability must be demonstrated not simply asserted.
Some shifting among methods is acceptable as data is analyzed. As the OECD
Guidelines state, “a transactional net margin method operates in a manner similar to the
101

The gross margins were 60.9% to 62.7% with a median of 61.7%. Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶80.
The gross margins were 59.2% to 63.7% with a median of 61.4%. Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶82.
103
Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶75.
104
Roche, [2008] ATA 639, at ¶75.
105
Under the 1995 OECD Guidelines profit-based methods, like the transactional net margin method, were
methods of “last resort.” In this sense then the method does matter.
102
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cost plus and resale price methods. This similarity means that in order to be applied
reliably, the transactional net margin method must be applied in a manner consistent with
the manner in which the resale price or cost plus method is applied”106. What does not
shift among methods, however, is the requirement that analysis must be based in proven
comparables.
A comparability analysis must be performed in all cases in order to select
and apply the most appropriate transfer pricing method, and the process
for selecting and applying a transactional net margin method should not be
less reliable than for other methods. … As with the resale price and cost
plus methods that the transactional net margin method resembles, this,
however, does not mean that a mere similarity of functions between two
enterprises will necessarily lead to reliable comparisons. … When the
comparable uncontrolled transactions being used are those of an
independent enterprise, a high degree of similarity is required in a number
of aspects of the associated enterprise and the independent enterprise
involved in the transactions in order for the controlled transactions to be
comparable; there are various factors other than products and functions
that can significantly influence net profit indicators107.
An example should make the Roche court problem much clearer. When Dr.
Wright searched the Prescription Division’s secondary manufacturing function for the
markup percentage, Dr. Wright began her search with 1,440 potential comparables.
Through an unspecified filtering process Dr. Wright eventually narrowed the pool to a
single French company and concluded this is the comparable.
If this is true, then we expect considerable firm-level analysis demonstrating
comparability. We are looking for something like Dr. Chandler’s four comparable
companies analysis in the Westreco case. We are looking for analysis that looks carefully
and comparatively at the five comparability factors: functions, risks, contractual terms,
economic conditions, and property or service.
Dr. Wright, however, did not appear to compare Roche Australia’s secondary
manufacturing function with the French company as Dr. Chandler did. Instead, Dr.
Wright simply holds up this single French company as the lone standard for determining
the markup. The French firm became the standard because it was the “last man standing”
after Dr. Wright applied her unspecified screens to the 1,440 potential comparables.
Responding to an American Bias
The court is well aware that Roche is the first Australian transfer pricing case, and
that there is not a lot of litigation-tested transfer pricing economists in Australia. The
court is also aware that the Australian statute108 and the relevant double tax treaties109 are
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not the same as §482 and regulations. It laments the lack of argument on these points.
All of the experts in this case are Americans:
Transfer pricing issues relating to taxation are apparently highly
sophisticated and highly complex in the United States. Each of the experts
is an economist specializing in the field. Their approach to the issues
before me must have been colored by their United States experience. At
times I wondered why Australian experts could not have approached this
matter with just as much skill as the experts from the United States but
without some of the presumptions which their work must have led to.
Unfortunately, none of the experts were either asked to, or did, directly
address the provisions of either the double tax treaties or the Assessment
Act. Had they done so my task might have been easier110.
One of the points the court needed to hear arguments on was whether or not Dr.
Wright’s segmentation of Roche Australia’s related party transactions was appropriate.
Did the seven pricing studies represent distinct transactions or were these transactions so
closely linked that they could not be examined separately?111 Was this segmentation a
prohibited adjustment to the controlled transaction under the Australia / Swiss and
Australia / Singapore double tax agreements?112
Adjustments are normally made to the referent, aligning it with the controlled
party. In this instance, however, Dr. Wright reversed the process, and made adjustments
to the controlled party to align it with the referents. In determining whether this is this
allowable, the court observes:
Although Dr Wright attempted to find companies whose activities were
comparable to those of Roche Australia it must have been difficult to
know precisely how much was outsourced in each case she selected and
whether it was comparable to the work Roche Australia carried out. It
also occurs to me that different arm’s length results may be obtained in a
company providing only one of a group of services such as clinical trials,
Australian and the Government of the Republic of Singapore for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the
Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income [1969] ATS 14.
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secondary manufacturing and distribution and marketing, compared with
a company providing all of those services. The one service company may
make a greater markup because it is a specialist while the multi service
company may make a greater markup because of the comprehensive
service it supplies. The important matter is not which one of these, or
some other alternative, is true, but simply that the availability of such
considerations damages the comparability of the figures.113
Segregation – the other aspect of adjusting comparables
What the Roche court is concerned about could be seen as the converse of a
comparability adjustment. Comparability adjustments are made to uncontrolled parties
to align them with controlled parties. Segmentation is just the reverse. Segmentation is
the process whereby certain transactions of controlled parties are isolated so that they can
be compared more precisely with transactions that have been identified between
uncontrolled parties.
Under both US and OECD rules it is appropriate to conduct separate and
aggregate arm’s length price tests. Aggregation is appropriate if taken as a whole, the
transactions are so interrelated that the transactions together are the most reliable means
to determine the arm’s length price.114 It is not appropriate to pull discrete transactions
from a group of interdependent transactions if the separation removes business elements
that have a definite and material effect on prices.
Dr. Wright segments Roche Australia into at least seven parts. She does this to
align discrete parts of Roche Australia with results from her database searches. What she
does not do is justify the segmentation. Because the court does not know why she
performs this segmentation, it rejects her database searches outright. Even though the
segmentation may indeed be appropriate, the court needs to be told “why” this is the case.
The court is not told. In particular, the court needs to know that the segmentation does
not remove from the comparison critical elements of the Roche Australia business
processes that have a material impact on prices. The court is not assured that this has not
happened. The court has been presented with a database dump, no more, no less.
The Roche court’s concern is echoed in a recent Canadian transfer pricing case,
GlaxoSmithKline v. The Queen.115 Once again in Glaxo we are concerned with a global
pharmaceutical company that has a controlled subsidiary marketing prescription
pharmaceuticals locally. The Roche / Glaxo comparison is very apt because Canada, like
Australia, is following the 1995 OECD Guidelines116. The concern in Glaxo is that the
government appears to be inappropriately segmenting the purchase of prescription
medication ingredients from the related license that allows the company to manufacture
and sell the finished product.
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(5) GlaxoSmithKline (2008 & 2010)
Glaxo Group Ltd., a UK based multinational pharmaceutical company that also
sells and manufactures pharmaceuticals globally. Glaxo Canada is the Canadian
subsidiary that secured the Canadian rights to manufacture and sell Zantac, an ulcer
medication in a license agreement with its UK parent. In a separate agreement Glaxo
Canada purchased ranitidine, the active ingredient in Zantac, from another related Swiss
based company (Adechsa S.A.).
Glaxo Canada paid a 6% royalty for the Canadian manufacturing and selling
rights. It paid between CAD 1,512 and CAD 1,635 per kilogram for ranitidine. The
Canadian Revenue Authority (CRA) adjusted the price Glaxo Canada paid for ranitidine,
ignoring the royalty arrangement.
The Deficiency
The CRA presented evidence that generic drug manufacturers in Canada
purchased chemically identical ranitidine for market prices between CAD 194 and CAD
304 per kilogram throughout the assessment period. These independent firms were able
to manufacture and sell a generic drug that was medically identical to Zantac. The CRA
argued that the prices these companies paid for ranitidine were comparable uncontrolled
prices.
The Tax Court upheld the CRA assessment based on a CUP methodology. The
court applied the highest per-kilogram price GlaxoSmithKline’s competitors paid for
ranitidine to the volumes Glaxo Canada Purchased. The difference (less a $25 per
kilogram adjustment for the finer GlaxoSmithKline ranitidine granulation) was allocated
to Glaxo Canada as unreported profits. The Tax Court followed the CRA’s lead and
disregarded the license agreement.
On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal found that the Tax Court had erred in its
arm’s length price determination for ranitidine, because the license agreement had a
material effect on the price paid for ranitidine. The Appeals Court indicated that the Tax
Court failed to consider a crucial business circumstance. The question is not: “What is
the fair market value of ranitidine?”117 The question is: “What would a reasonable
person in the same business circumstances as Glaxo Canada be willing to pay for
ranitidine?”
It would be pointless for Glaxo Canada to purchase ranitidine from Adechsa
without a license to manufacture and sell Zantac. A third party buyer, however, might be
willing to pay a premium for Adechsa ranitidine if doing so would allow it to
manufacture and sell a trademarked pharmaceutical drug (Zantac) that commands a
significant price premium over competing generic drugs.118 This is what the Tax Court
should have considered and the Appeals Court remanded the case back to the Tax Court
to make such a determination based on these facts. This is an instance where two
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transactions must be considered in the aggregate. The license cannot be segregated from
the ranitidine purchase.
In reaching its decision, the Canadian Federal Appeals Court found support in the
Australian Appeals Tribunal reasoning within the Roche decision. In the Appeals Court
decision, an internal comparable was identified that was applied to the prescription
pharmaceuticals Roche Australia imported. The Australian Tax Commissioner objected
that the prices Roche Australia paid were too high. The court, however, pointed out that
the foreign parent needed to be compensated not only for the tangible product but also for
the related intellectual property. These two transactions needed to be aggregated.119
Conclusion
If searches for comparables in commercial databases are becoming the norm in
transfer pricing120 and there is a growing tendency to substitute the search itself for sound
comparability analysis (the database dump),121 then what is the likely result if on audit or
through litigation all of a taxpayer’s proposed comparables are rejected? DSG Retail v.
HMRC, the final case considered in this paper, indicates that we will probably end up
with a profit split in an OECD jurisdiction.
(6) DSG Retail (2009)
DSG is the first decision of the Special Commission of Income Tax (now the
First-Tier Tax Tribunal) and the UK’s first substantive transfer pricing case. DSG looks
in detail at how to find “the most appropriate method”122. It is particularly concerned
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with what should be done when all proposed comparables fail because adequate
adjustments cannot be (or are not) made.
Background
The DSG group constitutes the largest electronics retail chain in the UK. Outlets
include Dixons, Currys, and PC World. DSG offers customers extended warranties at
check-out and for a fee consumers can purchase an extension to the manufacturer’s
warranty.
In-store DSG personnel function as agents for a third-party insurer, Cornhill
Insurance plc (Cornhill), that is based in the Isle of Man123. Cornhill was not, however,
prepared to hold more than 5% of the risk on an insurance contract124 so Cornhill
purchased reinsurance for the other 95%. In all cases the reinsurer was another DSG
company, Dixons Insurance Services Limited (DISL), a wholly owned DSG subsidiary
resident in the Isle of Man125.
Thus, Cornhill effectively ceded 95% of the proceeds from extended warranty
contracts back to the DSG group through DISL. DISL and Cornhill were both exempt
from income tax in the Isle of Man.
Assessing comparables
DISL’s non-existent bargaining power continually troubled the Special
Commission, especially when it only had three real employees.126 Any potential
comparable that could not explain how DISL achieved exceptional returns with three
employees performing routine activities and minimal bargaining power was rejected.
DSG offered the court six CUPs and a TNMM. All seven proposals were rejected
because adjustments could not be made to the uncontrolled parties to account for material
differences. Bargaining power was the critical difference. HMRC argued and the court
agreed that because all the comparables were inadequate, a profit split must be used. The
Special Commission did not reduce the proposed comparables reliability as would be
suggested under the US regulations. Instead it rejected the comparables as suggested
under the OECD Guidelines. The court aggregated all profits and then distributed among
the parties (DSG, Cornhill, and DISL) in accordance with their relative capital
contributions.
“[T]he basic idea of a return on the required capital is the same as Mr. Gayford’s
[HMRC’s expert] which in our view takes more relevant factors into account.” The
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Special Commission underscores that by moving to a profit split. The Special
Commission is therefore, in fact and in substance, following the OECD Guidelines.127
Mr. Gayford’s method was in accordance with the OECD Guidelines. In
terms of the Guidelines we consider that Mr. Gayford is using a profit split
method based on total profit with a mixture of contribution analysis and
residual analysis approach. … It is a mixture of the contribution analysis
and the residual analysis in that no first stage return is allocated to DSG,
which makes sense here since because of their bargaining position … all
the residual profit will be allocated to [DSG] … The only factor used by
Mr. Gayford which is not in accordance with the Guidelines was that he
used hindsight.128
Other DSG-type outcomes are likely
One of the key differences in the approach to comparability between the current
US regulations129 and 1995 and 2010 OECD Guidelines130 is what happens if adjustments
are not made for material differences. This difference is important, and it is likely to be
encountered by MNEs.
The likely situation is where one jurisdiction (an OECD jurisdiction) rejects a
transfer pricing study based on a database dump, and another jurisdiction (a jurisdiction
agreeing with the US approach) finds the comparables proposed in the database dump to
be acceptable, but with reduced reliability.
While all situations are unique, a rough road map for where this scenario might
arise can be inferred from comparative studies involving global APA programs. Most
APA programs release data on the transfer pricing methods used in successful
agreements. Because commercial databases are used most heavily with the CPM and
TNMM methods, it would stand to reason that a jurisdiction that resisted CPMs and
TNMMs in the APA process would be a jurisdiction that was inclined to reject rather
than work with database dumps.
For example, a recent comparative APA study indicated that the TNMM
comprised 93% of the South Korean,131 59% of the Australian,132 53% of the Italian,133
but only 39% of the Canadian APAs.134 In the US, the Cost Plus and Profit Split methods
taken in aggregate represent 65% of the APAs dealing with tangible and intangible
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property and 45% of the APAs dealing with services135. The Japanese data considered in
this study was not as robust because the TNMM was not accepted in Japan until March
2004. However, since 2004, the TNMM has grown in popularity in Japan and has
accounted for 35% of the APAs in 2005, 63% in 2007, and 72% in 2008136.
These statistics suggest that supporting a pricing decision with a CPM / TNMM
that relied on a database dump would be considerably more risky in a US / Canadian
context than in a US / South Korean context. Canada still follows the 1995 OED
Guidelines and retains a preference for the traditional over the profit-based methods.
Canada also requires adjustments for all material differences.137 South Korea, on the
other hand has adopted the 2010 OECD Guidelines. Korea has abandoned the methods
hierarchy in favor of the “most appropriate method.”138 Korea also requires adjustments
for material differences “… where possible, to improve the reliability of the
comparison”139.
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